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There were no relevant amendments of Australian law in 2014. The Competition Policy
Review released a draft report in September with recommendations on misuse of market
power prohibitions, cartel prohibitions, replacing bespoke price signaling laws with "con-
certed practices" laws, changing the unused formal merger clearance process, and remov-
ing per se prohibitions on third line forcing.2
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Advogados (BRA); Adam S. Goodman, Dentons Canada LLP (CAN); Peter Wang & Yizhe Zhang, Jones Day
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2. The Draft Report, COMPETITION POLICY REv. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/
files/2014/09/Competition-policy-review-draft-report.pdf.
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B. MERGERS
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) opposed four pro-
posed transactions, including the acquisition of a state-owned electricity generator by an
electricity retailer. Subsequently, the Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) authorized
the merger on public benefit grounds, the first ever merger authorization from ACT.3
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The ACCC unsuccessfully prosecuted two airlines on price fixing charges for airfreight
services, as the relevant conduct was found not to have occurred in a "market in Austra-
lia."4 The ACCC has not announced whether it will appeal.
In late 2013, the ACCC unsuccessfully prosecuted ANZ Bank for allegedly entering
into an anticompetitive agreement with a distributor (mortgage broker).5 In considering a
similar distribution relationship, the Federal Court found that a travel agent attempted to
enter into anti-competitive arrangements with several airlines and imposed a fine of A$11
million.6 Both decisions have been appealed.]
The ACCC released a revised immunity policy for cartel conduct, removing the "clear
leader" exception and clarifying immunity process and requirements.8
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
Pfizer faced proceedings alleging misuse of market power and exclusive dealing in rela-
tion to the supply of a generic version of the "blockbuster" drug atorvastatin, ahead of the
expiry of Pfizer's patent. 9 Judgment is expected in 2015.
3. Application forAuthorisation ofAcquisition ofMacquarie Generation byAGL Energy Ltd. [2014] ACompT 1
(Competition Tribunal) (Austl.).
4. ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd. [2014] FCA 1157 (Fed. Court of Austl.).
5. ACCC v Australia & New Zealand Bank. Grp. Ltd. [2013] FCA 1206 (Fed. Court of Austl.).
6. ACCC v Flight Centre Ltd. (No 3) [2014] FCA 292 (Fed. Court of Austl.); ACCC v Flight Centre Ltd. (No
2) [2013] FCA 1313 (Fed. Court of Austl.); see also Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n,
$11 million penalties imposed on Flight Centre (Mar. 28, 2014), available at http://www.accc.gov.au/media-
release/1 1-million-penalties-imposed-on-flight-centre.
7. ACCC v Flight Centre Ltd, AUSTL. COMPETITION LAw, http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/
cases/2013flightcentre.html#appeal (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
8. ACCC immunity and cooperation for cartel conduct, AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N (Sept.
2014), https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/884_ACCC%20immunity%20and%20cooperation%20policy%
20for%20cartel%20conduct_FA.pdf.
9. Press Release, Austl. Competition & Consumer Comm'n, ACCC takes action against Pfizer Australia
for alleged anti-competitive conduct (Feb. 13, 2014), available athttps://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-
takes-acion-against-pfizer-australia-for-alleged-anti-competitive-conduct.
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The Administrative Council for Economic Defense's (CADE) Resolution No. 2 sets out
the procedures for filing merger transactions and prescribes the requisite filing form.1o It
also addresses: (i) the concept of an economic group, (ii) what transactions should be filed
under the summary proceeding, and (iii) when minority shareholdings must be notified.
In 2014, Resolution No. 2 was amended to: (i) alter the concept of economic group for
investment funds, (ii) exempt proposed consolidation of control from notification, and (iii)
increase market share thresholds for vertically integrated companies eligible for the sum-
mary proceeding from twenty percent to thirty percent."
CADE published another resolution in 201412 defining the concept of "associative
agreement" for mandatory filing.13 According to this resolution, an agreement shall be
considered associative if its term exceeds two years and results in horizontal or vertical
cooperation or in risk sharing, creating an interdependent relationship between parties.
Now, an interdependent relationship arises when the joint market share in horizontal
agreements exceeds twenty percent, or, for vertical agreements, one of party's share ex-
ceeds thirty percent and (i) the parties share revenues or losses or (ii) the agreement man-
dates exclusivity.
B. MERGERS
CADE rejected the first proposed merger under the New Antitrust Law. The acquisi-
tion of Solvay Indupa by Braskem was rejected on grounds that it would harm competition
in the polyvinyl chloride market in South America.' 4
CADE's General Superintendence (GS) recommended the approval of the multijuris-
dictional merger of Holcim and Lafarge, conditional on a Merger Control Agreement,
because the transaction would result in a high market concentration in the cement and
ready-mix concrete markets in parts of Brazil."
10. Resoluqdo No. 2, de 29 de maio de 2012 (Resolution No. 2), DARIo OFICIAL DA UNIXo [D.O.U.] de
1.10.2014 (Braz.).
11. Resoluqdo No. 9, de 1 de outubro de 2014 (Resolunon No. 9), DIAIo OFICIAL DA UNIAo [D.O.U.] de
7.10.2014 (Braz.).
12. Resoluqio No. 10, de 29 outubro de 2014, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIXO [D.O.U.] de 4.11.2014 (Braz.).
13. Lei No. 12.529, de 30 de novembro de 2011, DiRio OFICIAL DA UNI&O [D.O.A.] de 1.12.2011
(Braz.).
14. C.A.D.E. [Administrative Council of Economic Defense], Ato de Concentragio No. 08700.000436/
2014-27, Relator: Conselheiro Gilvandro Vasconcelos Coelho de Araujo, 12.11.2014, 215, DiAIo OFICIAL
DE UNIAo [D.O.U], 6.11.2014,32 (Braz.); QuimicosDefendem Vendada SolvayaBraskem, ABCD MAIOR (Nov.
13, 2014), http://www.abcdmaior.com.br/noticia-exibir.php?nodcia=6302 1.
15. C.A.D.E. [Administrative Council of Economic Defense], Ato de Concentragio No. 08700.007621/
2014-42, Relator: Conselheiro Alessandro Serafin Octaviani Luis, 10.12.2014, 235, DARIo OFICIAL DE
UNIAo [D.O.U], 17.12.2014, 32 (Braz.).
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
CADE censured a cement cartel, marking the first ever imposition of divestitures in a
cartel case. 16 R$3.1 billion in fines were imposed on companies, individuals, and organi-
zations. A motion for clarification is pending.
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
The GS accused Telemar Norte Leste of abusing its dominance in telecommunications.17
The company is said to have previously monitored its clients' phone calls to a new en-
trant's call center in 2000, when Telemar had roughly ninety percent market share.1S
E. COURT DECISIONS
CADE has appealed from a Supreme Federal Court's (SEC) decision allowing any federal
court to hear challenges to CADE's decisions. CADE argues that such claims should be
filed before the Supreme Federal Court in Brasilia.19
In June, the SEC denied CADE's extraordinary appeal regarding jurisdiction over bank




There were no significant legislative amendments in Canada this year, but the Compe-
tition Bureau (Bureau) released new guidance regarding communications during the
course of its inquiries;21 price maintenance; 22 and intellectual property.23
16. C.A.D.E. [Administrative Council of Economic Defense], Processo Administrativo No. 08012.011142/
2006-79, Relator: Conselheiro Gilvandro Vasconcelos Coelho de Araujo, 21.5.2014, 96, DIARIo OFICIAL DE
UNIAo [D.O.U], 22.5.2014, 24 (Braz.).
17. Processo Administrativo [Administrative Proceeding] No. 08012.003918/2005-04, Telemar Norte
Leste S/A., Judgment.
18. Telemar Norte Leste Highlights From 4th Quarter/01, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/contain-
ers/fix029/10661 13/02/000106611302000010/t3_exp-010302.txt (last visited Jan. 25, 2014).
19. S.T.F. [Supreme Federal Trib.], Recurso Extraordinario No. 627.709 D.F., Relator: Min. Ricardo Le-
wandowski, 20.8.2014, 170, DIARIo OFICIAL DE UNIXO [D.O.U.], 3.9.2014, 34 (Braz.).
20. S.T.F. [Supreme Federal Trib.], Recurso Extraordinirio No. 664.189 D.F., Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli,
9.6.2014, 148, DiARIo OFICIAL DE UNIXO [D.O.U.], 31.6.2014, 644, 644-645 (Braz.).
21. Bulletin: Communication During Inquiries, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU (June 26, 2014), http://www
.compedtionbureau.ge.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-doc-com-inquiries-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-doc-com-inquiries-
e.pdf.
22. Enforcement Guidelines: Price Maintenance (Section 76 of the Competition Act, CAN. COMPETITION Bu-
REAU (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-eg-price-mainte-
nance-e.pdf/$file/cb-eg-price-maintenance-e.pdf.
23. Enforcement Guidelines: Intellectual Property, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www
.compedtionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-eg-ipegs-e.pdf/$file/cb-eg-ipegs-e.pdf
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B. MERGERS
The Bureau sought structural and behavioral merger remedies, notwithstanding its
traditional preference for the former.24 For example, Loblaw's acquisition of Shoppers
Drug Mart was approved subject to the divestiture of certain stores and behavioral restric-
tions regarding suppliers.25
Burger King's C$12.5 billion acquisition of Tim Hortons was cleared without remedies
due to remaining competition. 26
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Bureau ceased its LIBOR investigations but remained active in international and
domestic cartel investigations. 2 7 For example, the Bureau obtained fines from Japanese
bearings manufacturer NSK and Panasonic. 28
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
The Bureau settled against two water heater companies regarding return policies that
allegedly prevented consumer switching. 29 Settlements were also reached following
eBook pricing investigations,30 although retailer Kobo is challenging those settlements.31
E. COURT DECISIONS
A Competition Tribunal decision concerning access restrictions for the Toronto Multiple
Listing Service was overturned. 32 This decision establishes that an industry association
can be found to engage in anticompetitive behavior under the abuse of dominance
provisions.
24. Bulletin: Merger Remedies in Canada, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.compe-
titionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/MergersRemediesPDFEN.pdf/$FILE/Merg-
ersRemediesPDFEN1.pdf.
25. Competition Bureau Review of the Proposed Acquisition of Shoppers Drug Mart Corporation 'y Loblaw Compa-
nies Limited, Position Statements, CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.comped-
tionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03 703.html.
26. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau clears Burger King/Tim Hortons
merger (Oct. 28, 2014), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03828.html.
27. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Discontinues Its LIBOR Investigation
(Jan. 3, 2014), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03642.html.
28. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Japanese Bearings Manufacturer Fined $4.5 Million (Jan. 30,
2014), available at http://www.competitonbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03652.html; Press Release,
Can. Competition Bureau, Panasonic Fined $4.7 Million for Rigging Bids (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://
www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03669.html.
29. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Strengthens Competition in Ontario's
Water Heater Industry (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/
eng/03836.html.
30. Press Release, Can. Competition Bureau, Competition Bureau Takes Action to Promote Competition
for ebooks (Feb. 7, 2014), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03658
.html.
31. Kobo Inc. v Commissioner of Competition, 2014 Comp Trib 2 (Can.).
32. Comm'r of Competinon v. Toronto Real Estate Bd., 2014 F.C.A. 29 (Can. Fed. C.A.).
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A class action concerning alleged price fixing for polyether polyol was certified in
March,33 following the Supreme Court of Canada's "Trilogy," which decided that indirect
purchasers have a cause of action.34
IV. China
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), responsible for merger review under the
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), published Rules on Thresholds for Simple Cases35 and up-
dated the Guidelines for Notification of Concentration.3 6 The National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC), responsible for non-merger price violations, issued
Rules on Reporting of Price Related Violations37 and Rules on Administrative Penalty for
Price-Related Violations.38 The State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC), responsible for non-merger non-pricing antitrust enforcement, issued draft rules
on antitrust and intellectual property rights for comment.
B. MERGERS
MOFCOM unconditionally cleared over 150 mergerS 39 and cleared twenty-three under
the simple case procedure. 40 MOFCOM imposed conditions in four cases4 1 and blocked
the proposed P3 Network alliance of major shipping companies. 42
33. Crosslink Technology Inc. v. BASF Canada, 2014 ONSC 1682 (Can. Ont. S.C.J.) (unreported).
34. Infineon Tech. AG v. Option consommateurs, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 600 (Can.); Sun-Rype Prods. Ltd. v.
Archer Daniels Midland Co., [2013] 3 S.C.R. 545 (Can.); Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,
[2013] 3 S.C.R. 477 (Can.).
35. Guanyu Jingyingzhe Jizhong Jianyi Anjian Shiyong Biaozhun de Zanxing Guiding [Interim Provisions
on the Standards Applicable to Simple Cases of Concentration of Undertakings promulgated by the People's
Rep. of China MOFCOM, Feb. 11, 2014, effective Feb. 12, 2014) (China), availahe at http://fldj.mofcom
.gov.cn/artcle/c/201409/20140900743277.shtrnl.
36. Guanyu jingyfng zhe jfzhong shenbio de zhidao yijian [Guiding Opinions on the Application for Con-
centration of Undertakings (promulgated by the People's Rep. of China MOFCOM, June 6, 2014, effective
June 6, 2014) (China), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/201406/20140600614679.shtml.
37. Jiage Weifa Xingwei Jubao Chuli [Rules on Reporting of Price Related Violations promulgated by
National Development and Reform Commission, Jan. 15, 2014, effective May 1, 2014) (China), available at
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201401/t20140121_576448.html.
38. Guifan Jiage Xingzheng Chufaquan de Ruogan [Rules on Reporting of Price Related Violations
promulgated by National Development and Reform Commission, June 7, 2014, effective July 1, 2014),
(China), availahle at http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201406/t20140618_615520.html.
39. See generally Unconditional Clearance of Concentrations of Undertakings webpages (the People's Rep.
of China MOFCOM) (China), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/arcle/zcfb/201404/20140400540463.shtml; id.
available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/arcle/zcfb/201407/20140700650711.shtml; id. avaaibe at http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/arcle/zcfb/201410/20141000755915.shtrnl.
40. Simple Case Procedure Cases the People's Rep. of China MOFCOM) (China), availahle at http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/arcle/jyzjzjyajgs/.
41. Conditional Approval Decisions webpage (the People's Rep. of China MOFCOM) (China), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx.
42. Notice of Antitrust Review Decisions on Prohibiting Concentration of Maersk, MSC, and CMA to
Establish Network-Centric Business Promulgated by the People's Republic of China MOFCOM, June 17,
2014) (China), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/201406/20140600628586.shtml.
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Examples of NDRC and SAIC investigations and penalties include: (1) fines of US$195
million against auto parts manufacturers for price fixing;43 (2) fines of US$3 million
against glasses and contact lens companies for price maintenance;4 4 (3) settling with In-
terDigital regarding allegations of, among other things, unfairly high royalties;41 and (4)
investigations against Microsoft, Qualcom, TetraPak, and others for potential abuses of
dominance. 46
Dawn raids were employed in cartel, vertical restraint, and abuse of dominance cases.
D. COURT DECISIONS
China's Supreme People's Court (SPC) rendered its first decision under the AML,47
setting a precedent for market definition, the assessment of dominance and abusive con-
duct, and the use of economic analysis.
V. European Union
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In November, Margrethe Vestager succeeded Joaqufn Almunia as the European Com-
mission's (EC) Competition Commissioner, with a mission to promote a more economic
approach to antitrust enforcement, focusing on financial services, energy policy, the digi-
tal single market, state aid, and tax evasion.48
Before this transition, the EC adopted revised technology transfer rules,49 and consid-
ered extending the merger notification system to acquisitions of minority shareholdings.50
Legislation was adopted to facilitate damages claims for antitrust violations.51
43. Administrative Penalty Decisions Promulgated by National Development and Reform Commission)
(China), available at http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld.
44. Press Release, Nat'l Dev. and Reform Comm'n, Glasses and Contact Lens Companies Fined for Retail
Price Maintenance (May 29, 2014).
45. Press Release, Nat'l Dev. and Reform Comm'n, NDRC Suspends Investigation against InterDigital
Regarding Alleged Price Monopoly (May 22, 2014).
46. Press Release, China, Anti-trust Law Enforcement (Sep. 11, 2014). Microsoft Targeted in China Antitrust
Probe, FT, July 28, 2014, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/355714d0-1665-1le4-93ec-00144feabdcO
.html#axzz3JyPJLJzx.
47. Press Release, SPC, The Supreme Court Announced Final Decision on the First Anti-trust Case (Oct.
16, 2014).
48. Margrethe Vestager, Letter of mission (Nov. 1, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/cwt/files/
commissionermissionletters/vestager-en.pdf.
49. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission adopts revised competition regime for technology
transfer agreements (Mar. 21, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-14-299_en.htm.
50. Towards more effective EUMerger control, WHITE PAPER (July 9, 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/consultations/2014_mergercontrol/mergers-white-paper-en.pdf.
51. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission welcomes Council adoption of Directive on and-
trust damages actions (Nov. 10, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-14-299_en.htm.
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B. MERGERS
The cement industry generated several deals in 2014: the EC cleared asset swaps be-
tween Holcim and Cemex in France, Germany, the Netherlands,5 2 and Spain." The EC
also gave its green light to the proposed "megamerger" between Holcim and Lafarge,
subject to conditions.5 4
The EC imposed a 20 million fine on Marine Harvest for failure to notify of its acqui-
sition of Morpol,55 the second largest EC "gun jumping" fine since Electrabel.
C. ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The EC issued nine cartel decisions, with fines totaling -1.7 billion,56 and announced
that more fines are to be expected in the ongoing auto parts investigations. 57 Additionally,
in its second decision concerning reverse-payment patent settlements, the EC imposed
fines totaling 428 million on Servier and five generic pharmaceutical companies.58
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
In its first smartphone "patent wars" decision, the EC found that Motorola abused its
dominance by seeking an injunction against Apple on the basis of its standard essential
patents. 59 The investigation of Google's search and advertising services continues, after
Google's three successive remedy packages were considered unsatisfactory.60
E. COURT DECISIONS
The EU Court of Justice underscored that the concept of infringement "by object"
(which is close to a per se infringement) must be reserved to the most serious types of (i.e.,
52. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of Cemex West by Holcim in
the building materials sector (June 5, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-14-639_en
.htm.
53. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission approves acquisition of Holcim assets by Cemex in
the building materials sector (Sept. 9, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-14-985_en
.htm.
54. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: December 15, 2014, Commission approves acquisition of
Lafarge by Holcim, subject to conditions (Dec 15, 2014), available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease IP-14-2683-en.htm
55. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Mergers: Commission fines Marine Harvest 20 million for taking con-
trol of Morpol without prior EU merger clearance (July 23, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release IP- 14-862_en.htm.
56. EC cartel, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.
57. Joaquin Alumnia, Some highlights from EU competition enforcement (Sept. 19, 2014), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-14-608_en.htm.
58. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission fines Servier and five generic companies for curb-
ing entry of cheaper versions of cardiovascular medicine (July 9, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseIP-14-799_en.htm.
59. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission finds that Motorola Mobility infringed EU com-
petition rules by misusing standard essential patents (April 29, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-releaseIP-14-489_en.htm.
60. Joaquin Alumnia, EU competition policy and sectoral challenges (Sept. 12, 2014), available at http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/press-releaseSPEECH-14-592_en.htm.
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cartel-like) anticompetitive arrangements. 61 It also ruled that umbrella price damage
claims are allowed,62 and confirmed the EU's tough stance on fidelity- or exclusivity-type
rebates by dominant companies, despite the effects-based analysis advanced by Intel.63
VI. France
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A law, entered into force in October, organizes class actions and enables a limited num-
ber of government-approved consumer protection associations to bring actions before
civil courts and seek damages caused to consumers. The home court of the defendant will
have jurisdiction for handling the complaints, and the Paris court will have jurisdiction for
foreign defendants. The model contemplates an opt-in mechanism: consumers will have
to adhere to the class action and mandate a consumer association to conduct the
proceedings.
B. MERGERS
The French competition authority reviewed more than 150 merger filings, and received
four referrals of cases from the European Commission. Among notable decisions, an
April decision is interesting because the acquisition of exclusive control was not based on a
change in the target's shareholder structure, but on a long-term contract that gave the
acquirer control over production processes and sales policies. 64
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In November, the competition authority imposed fines below 1 million to three com-
panies regarding transportation services. 65 It also announced an investigation, at the re-
quest of the Minister for the Economy, into joint purchasing entities created by several
retailers.
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
There were several dominance cases in telecommunications, in one example, the Com-
petition Authority sanctioned SER for engaging in price discrimination between so-called
"in-net" and "off-net" phone calls. 66 Another notable decision concerned Nespresso for
61. Case C-67/13 P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document
.jsfltext=&docid=157516&pagelndex=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=443608.
62. Case C-557/12 Kone: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsPtext=&docid= 153312 &page
Index=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=493805.
63. Case T-286/09 Intel: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsfltext=&docid= 153543 &page
Index=O&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=444292.
64. Autorit6 de la Concurrence, Decision No. 14-DCC-57 of 17 April 2014 on the Acquisition of Sole
Control by Orlait Company Affiliate, Activity Shelf Milk Consumption (May 28, 2014).
65. Autorit6 de la Concurrence, Decision No. 14-D-16 of 18 November 2014 relating to Practices Imple-
mented in the Military Moving Industry Affected in Martinique.
66. Autorit6 de la Concurrence, Decision No. 14-D-05 of 13 June 2014 relating to practices Implemented
in the Mobile Phone Industry to Residential Customers in Reunion and Mayotte.
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bundling and tying in the markets for portioned coffee machines and for Nespresso cap-
sules.67 Nespresso and Nestle have committed to eliminate and modify a number of prac-




To plug loopholes in the merger notification rules, the Competition Commission of
India (CCI) amended merger control regulations to include a "substance test," whereby
notification requirements are based on the substance of the transaction, not just its form.
B. MERGERS
In separate cases, the CCI imposed its first penalties for gun-jumping on Etihad Air-
ways,6 8 and on Thomas Cook and Sterling Holidays.69
The CCI also held that acquisitions of shares and voting rights below 25 percent may
raise competition concerns where there is horizontal overlap or a vertical relationship
between acquirer and target. 70 Previously, such acquisitions made solely as investments or
during the ordinary course of business were exempt from notification.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER AGREEMENTS
In its first sector-wide investigation, the CCI imposed penalties on fourteen automobile
parts manufacturers.]1 It also intervened in the healthcare sector, imposing a penalty on
Hiranandani Hospital for exclusive anticompetitive agreements. 72
67. Autorit6 de la Concurrence, Decision No. 14-D-09 of 4 September 2014 on Practices Implemented by
Nestle Companies Nestec, Nestle Nespresso Nestle Nespresso France and Enterprises in the Espresso Ma-
chine Industry.
68. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, COMBINATION REGISTRATION No. C-2013/05/122 (Dec. 19,
2013), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/Order%20191213
.pdf.
69. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, COMBINATION REGISTRATION No. C-2014/02/153 (May 21,
2014), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2014-02-153R
.pdf.
70. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, COMBINATION REGISTRATION No. C-2014/08/202 (Nov. 10,
2014), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/CombinationOrders/C-2014-08-202.pdf.
71. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, SHRI SHAMSHER KASTARIA v. HONDA SIEL CARS INDIA LTD &
OTHERS, CASE No. 3 OF 2011 (Aug. 25, 2014), available athttp://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/
27/032011.pdf.
72. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, RAMAKANT KINI v. DR. L.H. HIRANANDANI HOSPITAL, CASE No.
39 oF 2012 (Feb. 5, 2014), availahle at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/27/392012.pdf
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D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
CCI pursued government-owned companies, finding Coal India Limited to have abused
its dominance with onerous supply agreements.7 3 It also held the Indian Trade Promotion
Organization abused its dominance over exhibition space licenses.74
E. COURT DECISIONS
The CCI has faced numerous challenges from the judiciary. Its jurisdiction in examin-
ing abuses by standard essential patent holders was successfully challenged before the
High Court. The Competition Appellate Tribunal, while upholding an order against real
estate giant DLF for abuse of dominance, observed that while the CCI can direct a party
to discontinue abusive conduct, it cannot modify agreements that contravene the Act.75
IX. Israel
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Israeli Restrictive Trade Practices Law (Law) excludes certain arrangements from
the Law, so they are not considered restrictive arrangements. An amendment effective
next March limits statutory exclusions for agricultural producers and wholesalers.
B. MERGERS
In 2012, the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) blocked an acquisition by the Azrieli
Group (Azrieli), a large commercial real estate group, of a shopping complex from Mash-
har Shopping and Leisure Centers (Mashhar). Azrieli appealed in 2013, but the appeal
was dismissed as "theoretical" because the transaction had since been abandoned. Its fur-
ther appeal to the Supreme Court in 2014 succeeded, arguing that the 2013 decision im-
munizes the IAA from judicial review, as parties rarely maintain a merger throughout the
appeal process. The case has been sent back to the Antitrust Tribunal (AT).76
In July, ShuferSal, Israel's largest supermarket chain, and its executives were convicted
of violations, inter alia, of merger conditions regarding the merger between ShuferSal and
ClubMarket. The executives were fined and sentenced to prison and community service,
while ShuferSal had to pay a fine of US$800,000.77 An appeal is pending.
Following an investigation into alleged violations of merger conditions by the Israeli
bookstore chain, Steimatzky, the IAA issued a decision regarding a merger between Stei-
matzky and another bookstore chain. Suspicions arose following Steimatzky's alleged de-
73. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, SHRI BIJAY PODDAR V. M/S COAL INDIA LIMITED AND ITS SUBSID-
IARIES, CASE No. 59 or 2013 (Oct. 27, 2014), available at http://cci.gov.in/May2011/OrderOfCommission/
27/592013.pdf.
74. COMPETITION COMM'N OF INDIA, INDIAN EXHIBITION INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION V M/O COMMERCE
& INDIAN TRADE PROMOTION ORGANIZATION, CASE No. 74 oF 2012 (Apr. 3, 2014), available at http://cci
.gov.in/May201 1/OrderOfCommission/27/742012.pdf.
75. COMPETITION APP. TRIB., M/s DLF LIMITED V. CCI & OTHERS, APPEAL No 20 or 2011 (May 19,
2014), available at http://compat.nic.in/upload/PDFs/mayordersApp2014/19_05_14.pdf.
76. CA 6426/13 Azrieli Group Ltd. v. General Dir. of the IAA [2014] (Isr.).
77. CC 118/10 Antitrust Auth. v. Rozenhaus (2014) (Isr.).
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mand for exclusive rights to sell certain titles at discounted prices. In July, the AT
approved a Consent Decree between the IAA, Steimatzky, and its CEO with no admission
of liability. Steimatzky paid approximately US$400,000 to the State Treasury and its
CEO paid approximately US$14,000.78
C. CARTEL AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In August, the IAA published a Draft Policy Paper regarding unilateral public disclosure
statements and publications potentially harming competition. The IAA notes the guide-
lines provided will bring policies in line with OECD Best Practices and the antitrust laws
of the EU and United States. 79
In September, it published a non-binding paper setting trade association contact stan-
dards, stating that though trade associations are important institutions, their activity may
threaten competition by enacting restrictive arrangements, facilitating the exchange of
sensitive information or boycotts. 0
D. COURT DECISIONS
The IAA reached an agreement with Israel's five largest banks regarding alleged restric-
tive arrangements of bank fee information. In June, the AT approved the agreement as a
Consent Decree. The banks had to pay approximately US$19 million to the State Trea-
sury, without admission of liability.
E. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
In April, the IAA published Guidelines regarding the Prohibition on Excessive Pricing
by a Monopoly. These Guidelines state excessive pricing might be deemed an abuse of
dominance by a monopoly.s1
In November, the IAA published a decision (Determination) stating that Bezeq, Israel's
leading telecommunication company, abused its monopolistic position by engaging in a
"margin squeeze" by offering internet access infrastructure, an essential service for in-
ternet based telephone services, to competitors at a higher price, thus putting them at a
disadvantage. 82
78. AT 42033-06-14 General Dir. of Restrictive Trade Practices v. Steimatzky (2005) Ltd. (2014) (Isr.).
79. Israeli Antitrust Auth., Draft Policy Paper: Unilateral Public Disclosures May Facilitate Cartel-Like Pricing,
(Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.antitrust.gov.il/subject/131/item/33262.aspx.
80. Israeli Antitrust Auth., Trade Associations Policy Paper, (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.antitrust.gov.il/sub-
ject/130/item/33332.aspx.
81. Israeli Antitrust Auth., Excessive Pricing Policy Paper, (Apr. 09, 2014), http://www.antitrust.gov.il/sub-
ject/130/item/33113.aspx.
82. Israeli Antitrust Auth., Determination on the ground ofsection 43(A)(5) to the Israeli Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Law 5748-1988-Bezeq-The Israel Telecommunication Corp, Ltd - abuse of dominant position, (Nov. 16, 2014),
http://www.anitrust.gov.il/subject/126/item/33396.aspx.
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A new competition law came into force in July, strengthening the Federal Economic
Competition Commission's (Cofece) powers, and introducing new powers and novel legal
concepts, some of which are controversial.
The law contemplates: (i) strengthened dawn raid powers (allowing access to any place,
storage or electronic device, or other source of evidence and compelling explanations re-
garding any document or information obtained during the raid) and coercive measures
(Cofece may order the arrest of individuals for obstructing an investigation); (ii) decisions
to initiate an investigation will no longer be published in the Federal Official Gazette; and
(iii) Cofece will have powers to file a claim or complaint regarding presumed criminal
conduct in antitrust matters, with no need to wait until a final resolution is issued by the
Plenary in the administrative stage.
New offenses have been created: (i) the exchange of information between competitors,
when resulting in, or having the purpose of, price fixing, allocation of markets, restricting
output or rigging bids, has been incorporated as an independent cartel violation; and (ii)
companies with a dominant position may not restrict or grant discriminatory access to
"essential inputs" or engage in conduct resulting in a margin squeeze. Additionally,
Cofece will have authority to order measures to eliminate "barriers to free competition",
to conduct studies to look for market power, and to order divestitures.
For mergers: (i) filing thresholds were modified so that only annual sales originating in
Mexico or assets in the Mexican territory are taken into consideration; (ii) mergers cannot
be completed until clearance is obtained, making Mexico's a suspensory regime; (iii) the
time for assessing mergers increased from thirty-five to sixty business days (plus an addi-
tional forty days in complex cases); and (iv) Cofece is obliged to inform the parties of any
possible risks to competition that may result from a transaction, in order for the parties to
submit remedies or conditions proposals. 3
B. MERGERS
Cofece resolved over eighty-five concentrations, all of which were authorized (four with
conditions). Significant authorizations included: (i) the acquisition of Merck's consumer
care business by Bayer; (ii) the acquisition of Farmacias Ahumada by Alliance Boots; and
(iii) the clearance of the alliance between Toyota and Mazda to jointly manufacture a new
compact car.84
83. Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal de Competencia Econdmica y se reforman y adicionan
diversos articulos del C6digo Penal Federal [Decree on the Federal Antitrust Law amending and supplement-
ing the Federal Penal Code], Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 23 de mayo de 2014 (Mex.).
84. Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Bayer Aktiengesellschaft/
Merck & Co., Inc., Report No. CNT-045-2014; Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of
Competition], AB Acquisitions Holdings Limited/Alliance Boots GMBH/Walgreen Co./Walgreen Scotland
Investments LP/Walgreen Swiss International GMBH, Report No. CNT-082-2014; Comision Federal de
Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Mazda Motor Manufacturing de Mexico, S.A. de C.V./
Toyota Motor de Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V., Report No. CNT-052-2014.
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C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Cofece initiated six investigations for cartel conduct in: (i) healing materials; (ii) airport
ground transportation; (iii) cranes and dragging services in Guerrero; (iv) maritime trans-
portation in Quintana Roo; (v) music rights licenses; and (vi) latex products.8 5 There are
currently fourteen ongoing investigations. 86
Furthermore, Cofece sanctioned diverse real estate agents (companies and individuals)
for a total amount of approximately US$4 million for price fixing of commissions.8 7
Cofece sanctioned five appliance companies for approximately US$14.7 million for price
fixing in the market for hermetic compressors. 8
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
Cofece initiated only one new investigation for abuse of dominance conduct, in the
market for air gases. Specific conduct being investigated includes tying agreements, exclu-




In 2014, the procedure for post-transaction notifications was abolished in order to de-
crease the administrative burden on the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian
Federation (FAS).
The government also approved a draft law which significantly amends the Competition
Law and referred it to the State Duma (lower house) of the Russian Parliament for consid-
eration. These amendments are commonly called the "Fourth Antimonopoly Package." 90
85. Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Mercado de materiales de
curaci6n de polietileno adquiridos por el sector salud en el territorio nacional, Report No. DE-020-2014;
Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Servicios de arrastre de vehiculos,
Report No. DE-023-2013; Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], De los
servicios de transporte maritimo de pasajeros en el estado de Quintana Roo, Report No. DE-002-2014;
Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Otorgamiento de licencias para la
comunicaci6n o utilisaci6n p1iblica de obras musicales, sus interpretaciones o ejecuciones, de fonogramas y
videogramas en el territorio nacional, Report No. DE-025-2013; Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal
Commission of Competition], Producci6n, distribuci6n y comercializaci6n de productos de latex adquiridos
por el sector salud en el territorio nacional, Report No. DE-024-2013.
86. Note that as ofJuly 7, 2014 Cofece no longer publishes decisions to initiate investigations and therefore
additional investigations might have been initiated.
87. Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Servicios proporcionados
por asesores en bienes raices, corredores, agentes, administradores y, en general, profesionales del ramo in-
mobiliario, Report No. DE-019-2007.
88. Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Producci6n, distribuci6n y
comercializaci6n de compresores hermeticos, Report No. 10-002-2009.
89. Comision Federal de Competencia [Federal Commission of Competition], Producci6n, distribuci6n y
comercializaci6n de gases del aire, Report No. DE-006-2014.
90. Draft of the Federal Law No. 5906?-?13 of Sept. 12, 2014 amending Federal Law No. 135-FZ of Oct.
26, 2006, available at http://asozd2c.duma.gov.ru/addwork/scans.nsf/ID/3D7F7ECD370205AC43257D5100
5F7B90/$FILE/602468-6.pdf.
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Further, after being considered by the State Duma, the draft bill on collective actions is
now being revised. One amendment, developed by non-governmental organizations and
academics, would increase the number of plaintiffs necessary for filing a class action suit
from five to twenty. 91
B. MERGERS
Based on the decreased number of applications and notifications considered by the an-
timonopoly authorities, the number of transactions considered by the FAS likely will in-
crease as a result of the forthcoming amendments to the Competition Law. According to
those amendments, the list of transactions under the jurisdiction of the FAS will include
joint venture agreements where specific thresholds are met.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
Russia's economy is permeated by thousands of foreign entities, some of which engage
in practices that violate the Russian antimonopoly regime. In response, the FAS believes
that protecting the economic interests of Russia from international cartels must be done
through strengthening antimonopoly regulation. Accordingly, the FAS is deepening co-
operation with foreign competition agencies in investigations of domestic and interna-
tional cartels.
Moreover, although the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation has criminalized car-
tels since 2009, it is only recently that this provision has actually been used. In 2014, the
first cartel conviction was issued. Undoubtedly, this decision will have a significant impact
in future cases.
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
In 2013, there was a marked increase in the number of publicized cases of violations of
Article 10 of the Competition Law (abuse of dominance). 92 According to the 2013 FAS
report, 3,370 violations were publicized in 2013, a 10% increase from 2012.93
XI. South Africa
In 2014, the South African competition authorities focused more on public interest
factors in merger reviews and exercised their new powers to initiate market inquiries. The
government also addressed staff shortages which plagued the authorities in 2013.94
91. Press Release, FAS, Lawyers are trying to change the requirements for class action] (Feb. 7, 2014),
http://fas.gov.ru/fas-in-press/fas-in-press_38287.html.
92. 0 3amHTe Komcypenuhl No. 135-03 (c HMHeuMMH H AononnlJeHu1Mm) [On Protection of Competi-
tion No. 135-FZ, as amended], Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF]. 2006. No. 31 (1).
CT. 3434 [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 31 (1 p.). Art. 3434 (Russ.).
93. FAS, Report on the State of the Competition in Russia, 2014, (2014), available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/
netcat files/225/164/h 9b92126b92al3bcf9f26422c223d22ef.
94. Press Release, Econ. Dev. Dep't of S. Mr., Minister Patel Announces Appointment of New Competi-
tion Commissioner, (May 16, 2014), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Minister-
Patel-announces-appointment-of-new-Competion-Commissioner.pdf, Press Release, Competition Trib. S.
Mr., Appointment of Chairperson and Members of the Competinon Tribunal, (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www
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A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
There were no relevant legislative changes in South Africa in 2014, but the Minister of
Economic Development has suggested amendments to extend the authority's powers to
order divestitures by dominant firms in abuse cases. 95
B. MERGERS
In Oceana's acquisition of Foodcorp, the Tribunal required the divestment of Foodcorp's
fishing quota because the combination of the merging parties' rights was said to enable an
already dominant player to increase its power and undermine competition from other
players.96 The decision was successfully appealed.97
The authorities' increasingly broad view of their powers to impose conditions on merg-
ers in the "public interest" is illustrated by AgriGroupe's buyout of Afgri, in which the
Tribunal required the establishment of a fund and a development program for emerging
farmers. 98 In response, merging parties have had to be more proactive in ameliorating
potentially adverse employment effects before seeking merger approval, as was done in the
Nashua Mobile transactions. 99
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The Commission has referred cartel complaints in the power-cable,oo fishing,o1 and
construction industries10 2 (despite having settled numerous construction cartel complaints
.comptrib.co.za/publications/press-releases/appointment-of-chairperson-and-members-of-the-competidon-
tribunal/.
95. Carol Paton, Patel Reworks Competition Act against Excessive Pricing, BUSINEssDAY, (Aug. 11, 2014),
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/08/i 1/patel-reworks-compeddon-act-against-excessive-pricing.
96. Ann Crotty, Oceana Set to Battle for Foodcorp's Fishing Business, BusINEss TIMEs, (July 06, 2014), http://
www.bdlive.co.za/businessmes/2014/07/06/oceana-set-to-battle-for-foodcorp-s-fishing-business.
97. Id.
98. Case No. 017939 (Competition Tribunal) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/
Uploads/017939.pdf.
99. Altech Autopage Cellular (Pty) Limited v. Nashua Mobile (Pty) Limited in respect of its Cell C subscriber base
(Nashua), 2014 Case No. 019166 (Competition Tribunal) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/
assets/Uploads/019166.pdf.; Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Limited and Nashua, 2014 Case No. 019018
(Competition Tribunal) (S. Afr.), available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/019018.pdf; Vodacom
(Pty) Limited and Nashua, 2014 Case No. 019034 (Competition Tribunal) (S. Mr.), available at http://www
.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/27.pdf.
100. Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Comm'n Refers Cable Investigation (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Media-Release-Commission-refers-cable-investi-
gation.pdf.
101. Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., The Commission Refers Fishing Collusion Investiga-
tion (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/The-Commission-refers-
fishing-collusion-investigadon.pdf.
102. Katy Oglethorpe, SA takes World Cup Riggers to Court, GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW (Nov. 13,
2014), http://globalcompentionreview.com/news/article/37261/sa-takes-world-cup-riggers-court/.
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through the "fast-track" settlement process). 0 3 The Commission also conducted dawn
raids in the edible oil104 and auto body repair'05 industries.
The Commission exercised its new market inquiry powers by publishing terms of refer-
ence for inquiries into private healthcarelo6 and liquefied petroleum gas.1 07
D. ABUSE OF DOMINANCE
The Tribunal found that Sasol Chemical Industries charged excessive prices for inputs
in plastics manufacturing.108 It was critically important that Sasol's acquisition of domi-
nance was achieved through State support, and that the relevant inputs are low-cost be-
cause they are by-products of Sasol's fuel production process. The matter is being
appealed.1 09
E. COURT DECISIONS
The Constitutional Court held that costs cannot be awarded against the Commission in
Tribunal proceedings and that the Competition Appeal Court should only award such
costs in its own proceedings where the Commission has not litigated in good faith." 0
In the healthcare inquiry, the High Court dismissed a case brought by hospital group
Netcare seeking to interdict KPMG, which had previously performed consulting work for
Netcare, from being appointed as the Commission's healthcare inquiry technical service
provider."'
103. Norton Rose Fulbright, 2011 - a year in review - competition law in South Africa, (Jan. 9, 2012), http://
www.nortonrosefulbright.com/news/61536/201 1-a-year-in-review-competidon-law-in-south-africa.
104. Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Unilver SA and Sime
Darby Offices (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-Com-
mission-raids-Unilever-SA-and-Sime-Darby-offices.pdf
105. Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Competition Commission Raids Precision and Eldan
offices (July 4, 2014), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-Commission-
raids-Precision-and-Eldan-offices.pdf
106. Press Release, Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Commission Outlines the Guidelines and Statement of
Issues for the Private Healthcare Inquiry (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/
2014/09/Media-Release-Health-Inquiry-Stakeholder-Engagement-Meeting.pdf
107. Competition Comm'n of S. Afr., Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Market Inquiry, , http://www
.compcom.co.za/lpg-inquiry/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
108. Competition Comm'n of S. Afr. v. Sasol Chem. Indus. Ltd., 2014 48/CR/AuglO, available at http://www
.comptrib.co.za/assets/Uploads/Non-Conf-Decision-0 11502.pdf.
109. Ann Crotty, Sasol Faces Battle Over Appeal Bid, Bus. TIMEs (June 29, 2014, 7:24 AM), http://www
.bdlive.co.za/businesstimes/2014/06/29/sasol-faces-battle-over-appeal-bid.
110. Competition Comm'n of S. Afr. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 2013 ZACC 50 (CC) at paras. 42-43, 47 (S.
fr.), availahle at http://41.208.61.234/uhtbin/cgisirsi/20140128181712/SIRSI/0/520/J-CCT58-13.
111. Netcare Hospitals (Pty.) Ltd. v. KPMG Services (Pty.) Ltd., 2014 ZAGPJHC Case No. 47505 at para.
140 (S. Mr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPJHC/2014/186.html.
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XIII. United Kingdom
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Last year heralded significant change to the institutional structure of the U.K. competi-
tion law regime with the creation of a new, single competition authority, the Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA).112 The CMA fully took over in April, replacing the Office
of Fair Trading (OFT) and the Competition Commission.
The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013113 created the CMA and introduced
changes to the U.K. antitrust, mergers, and markets regimes. In particular, the CMA can
compel individuals to answer questions in Competition Act 1998 investigations.
The dishonesty requirement was removed from the U.K. criminal cartel offense, but
new exemptions and defenses were introduced.
The U.K's merger notification regime remains voluntary. But the CMA now has en-
hanced powers to impose hold-separate undertakings; businesses which fail to comply risk
significant penalties.
B. MERGERS
In June, the CMA referred the proposed Pure Gym-The Gym merger for a detailed
Phase II inquiry.1 4 Unusually, the CMA raised concerns that the merger might affect
both actual and potential competition." 5 The parties abandoned the merger, using a new
procedural right of parties to suspend the Phase II review for up to three weeks to con-
sider whether to proceed with the merger proposal.116
In August, the CMA relied on the failing firm defense to clear the merger of Alliance
Medical and IBA Molecular at Phase II.117
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
In March, the former OFT fined Hamsard £387,856 for cartel conduct.11 8 The OFT
found that Hamsard and Lloyds Pharmacy had agreed to share the market for the supply
112. Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act, 2013, c. 24 (U.K.), available at http://www.legisladon.gov.uk/
ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted.
113. Id.
114. Press Release, Competition and Markets Authority, CMA Refers Gyms Merger for In-Depth Investi-
gation (June 26, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-refers-gyms-merger-for-in-depth-
investigation.
115. Id.
116. Press Release, Pure Gym, Pure Gym and The Gym Group Terminate Merger Plan After Regulator
Refers Transaction for In-Depth Investigation (July 16, 2014), http://www.thegymgroup.com/blog/arcle/
pure-gym-and-the-gym-group-termiinate-merger-plan-after-regulator-refers-transaction-for-in-depth-inves-
tigation-6469/.
117. Press Release, Competition and Markets Auth., Radioactive Tracer Merger Cleared (Aug. 15, 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/radioacive-tracer-merger-cleared.
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of prescription medicines to care homes in England. The OFT also issued a decision
regarding pricing restrictions for online mobility scooter sales.119
D. COURT DECISIONS
In Skyscanner,12 0 the U.K. Competition Appeal Tribunal heard the first ever judicial re-
view of a U.K. commitments decision in the Hotel Online Booking case and quashed the
former OFT's decision, remitting the matter back to the new CNIA..
In relation to time limits for follow-on damages actions, the U.K. Supreme Court ruled
that a European Commission (Commission) decision establishing an infringement consti-
tutes a series of individual decisions addressed to its addressees.1 21 Further, "the only
relevant decision establishing infringement in relation to [a non-appealing] addressee ...




The Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill to
amend the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts to align the standards and
processes for Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or Department of Justice (DOJ) review of
proposed mergers and acquisitions.12 3 If it becomes law, the FTC would review mergers
under the Clayton Act's standards (as the Attorney General currently does) and would no
longer engage in the administrative adjudication of mergers and other transactions.1 24
119. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading, OFT Issues Decision in Mobility Scooters Sector (Mar. 27,
2014), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http:/www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/
press/2014/23-14.
120. Skyscanner v. Competition and Markets Auth., [2014] CAT 16 at paras. 1, 174 (Eng. & Wales), availahle
at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1226_SkyscannerjudgmentCAT_16_260914.pdf.
121. Deutsche Balm AG v. Morgan Advanced Materials, [2014] UKSC 24 at paras. 1, 28 (U.K.), available at
https://www.supremecourt.uk/decided-cases/docs/UKSC_2012_0209Judgment.pdf .
122. Id.
123. Press Release, H.R. Judiciary Comm., Judiciary Committee Approves Antitrust Legislation (Sept. 10,
2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/9/judiciary-committee-approves-antitrust-legislation.
124. Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2014, H.R. 5402, 113th Cong.
(2014).
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B. MERGERS
Three companies-Embarcadero Technologies,125 Flakeboard America Ltd.,126 and
Louisiana-Pacific Corp.1 27-abandoned proposed mergers after the DOJ expressed con-
cern about "likely anticompetitive effects."
In January 2013, in a rare post-acquisition challenge, the DOJ filed a civil suit against
Bazaarvoice Inc., the leading provider of online reviews and ratings platforms, challenging
Bazaarvoice's acquisition of rival PowerReviews.1 2 8 In January, following a three-week
trial, the court found that Bazaarvoice had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act by acquir-
ing PowerReviews. In April 2014, the DOJ and Bazaarvoice agreed that Bazaarvoice
would divest all assets of PowerReviews and take additional measures to restore competi-
tion in the market.
C. CARTELS AND OTHER ANTICOMPETITIVE PRACTICES
The DOJ Antitrust Division secured large criminal fines from its London Interbank Of-
fered Rate (LIBOR) and auto parts investigations. Among others who pled guilty, Lloyds
Banking Group agreed to pay US$86 million for its actions in manipulating the LI-
BOR.129 For their roles in a conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids for automotive parts,
eight Japanese manufacturers agreed to plead guilty and, in combination, paid US$753
million in fines.130 The DOJ also prosecuted defendants in California, Georgia, and New
Jersey for their roles in rigging bids at municipal foreclosure and tax lien auctions. 131
The DOJ secured the first litigated extradition on an antitrust charge for a former exec-
utive of a rubber hose manufacturer who pled guilty to a "conspiracy to rig bids, fix prices,
and allocate market shares of marine hoses sold in the United States."1 32
125. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Embarcadero Technologies and CA Inc. Terminate Proposed
Transfer of CA Inc.'s Erwin Data Modeler (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/
2014/309752.pdf.
126. Press Release, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, Flakeboard Abandons Its Proposed Acquisition of SierraPine (Oct.
1, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2014/309005.pdf.
127. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Louisiana-Pacific Corp. Abandons Its Proposed Acquisition of
Ainsworth Lumber Co. Ltd. (May 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2014/305936
.pdf.
128. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Justice Department and Bazaarvoice Inc. Agree on Remedy to
Address Bazaarvoice's Illegal Acquisition of PowerReviews (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-bazaarvoice-inc-agree-remedy-address-bazaarvoice-s-illegal-acquisition.
129. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Lloyds Banking Group Admits Wrongdoing in Libor Investigation,
Agrees to Pay $86 Million Ciminal Penalty (July 28, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/
2014/307355.pdf.
130. Press Release, U.S. Dept. ofJustice, DOJ, Hitachi Metals Ltd. Agrees to Plead Guilty for Fixing Prices
and Rigging Bids on Automotive Parts Installed in U.S. Cars (Oct. 31, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/press-releases/2014/309636.htm.
131. U.S. Dept. ofJustice Antitrust Div_, A i Division 2014 Criminal Enforcement Update, (Spring 2014),
http://www.jusice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2014/criminal-program.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2015).
132. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Former Marine Hose Executive Who Was Extradited to United
States Pleads Guilty for Participating in Worldwide Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (Apr. 24, 2014), http://www
.jusice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2014/305376.htm.
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D. MONOPOLIZATION
The DOJ tried a case, under reserve, against American Express (AmEx), alleging that
the company's "anti-steering" rules prohibiting merchants from encouraging customers to
use other credit cards violated antitrust law.133 During the trial, the parties hotly disputed
numerous issues, including the relevant market, the effects on competition, and AmEx's
market power.
E. COURT DECISIONS
In November, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued its ruling after rehearing
Motorola Mobility LLC v. Au Optronics Corp.134 The issue on appeal was whether An Op-
tronics Corp.'s sales of LCD panels to Motorola's foreign subsidiaries, that were then
incorporated into phones and shipped to other countries, including the United States,
were excluded from the reach of the Sherman Act because the conduct did not have a
"direct" effect on U.S. commerce as required by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act (FTAIA). While the court said it was possible for price fixing abroad to have a
foreseeable, substantial effect on U.S. commerce, bringing it under the Sherman Act, Mo-
torola's claim was barred by the FTAIA's requirement that "the effect of anticompetitive
conduct on domestic U.S. commerce give rise to an antitrust cause of action." Thus, the
court held that Motorola was not the proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust suit in the
United States because the harm was incurred by Motorola's foreign subsidiaries and not
the parent company itself. In a criminal case brought by the DOJ's Antitrust Division
charging a price-fixing scheme of TFT-LCDs sold directly to U.S. companies, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the convictions of AUO and its executives, holding that the FTAIA does
not exclude import trade from the Sherman Act or activities that have a "direct, substan-
tial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce." 135
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in North Carolina State Board of Dental Ex-
aminers v. FTC and heard arguments in October.1 36 The Supreme Court is considering
whether a quasi-public board of dental examiners could be found to have violated the
antitrust laws for allowing only dentists to use teeth-whitening technology.137
133. United States of America v. American Express Co, No. 1: 10-cv-04496-NGG-RER (E.D.N.Y. May 7,
2014).
134. Motorola LLC v. An Optronics Corp., No. 14-8003 (7th Cir. Nov. 26, 2014).
135. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, No 13-534 (US
2014), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/13-534_8nj9.pdf.
137. Id. at 12, 20.
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